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Comments
A CONSTRUCTIVE "PROPERTY RIGHT" AND ITS
"VALUE")*
IN the course of obsolescence of the New York elevated railways
the spur in East 42nd Street from Third Avenue to the Grand
Central Station became a source of loss to the railway company
and a useless annoyance to abutting owners and the public.
It has been removed under a statute requiring that the "cost,
expense, compensation, and damages" incident to its removal be
assessed "upon real property benefited as a result thereof." The
railway claims as an item of "compensation" the entire in-
crease in the value of abutting real estate due to the removal
of the spur.
The original installation of the spur diminished for a time
the value of abutting property. Over forty years ago the rail-
way had to pay about $200,000 for this diminution. It says-
well backed by authority-that it got in return a perpetual "prop-
erty right" to impair abutting real estate with its spur. This
right being taken or destroyed by the erasure of the spur, the
railway claims as the measure of value the "present cost of re-
production." Since the erasure of the spur adds $3,600,000 to
the value of abutting real estate, that presumably is what it
would cost the railway to-day if it had to reproduce the extin-
guished "property right." A comment in the March issue of this
journal supports the railway's demand for that amount upon an
ingenious theory which, once grasped, is more persuasive.1 And
two courts, as if cutting a knot with an axe after failing to untie
it, have deemed the railway entitled to smaller sums.2
This comment invites consideration of the present utility of
the "property" premise upon which the conclusions of the courts
purport to rest, and from which the conclusion of the March
comment logically follows. Perhaps a life-time of judicial usage
has made that premise obligatory. But such consequences as
seem to impend in the East 42d Street situation are a far cry
from the intentions that prevailed at the baptismal font when
* This comment is a dissent from that appearing in the March issue
entitled Valuation of Easements in Condemnation of Elevated Railroads,
(1931) 40 YALE L. J. 779.
1 Comment, supra star footnote.
21n re Elevated Railroad Structures in East 42d Street, City of New
York, 126 Misc. 879, 216 N. Y. Supp. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1926); modified 229
App. Div. 617, 243 N. Y. Supp. 665 (1st Dep't 1930).
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the results of payments of damages incident to public improve-
ments were christened "property rights." The right to such
payments was conceived in the tort, not the property, family.
Its procreation was by the sense of justice, which, fearing that
its offspring would be illegitimate, induced the property family
to adopt it at birth.
The illegitimacy to be avoided was that of so-called liability
without fault. The instances of such liability which had crept
into law were still hotly resented as anomalous; 3 the category
was not to be enlarged. To allow recovery for damage insepar-
able from the duly authorized operation of a pubilc utility would
set up a new instance of liabilty without fault. For "no court
can treat that as a wrong which the legislature has authorized."'
But under constitutions forbidding the "taking" of property for
public use without compensation, no legislature can make right
the wrong of such a taking. Since the flooding of a farmer's
field by an authorized dam would become a remediable legal
wrong if it could be called a "taking," just emotion, perverting
language, changed innocence to fault by calling it that. And
various other losses caused by public utilities, though not all
losses, or the same losses everywhere, were, by changing their
names, "transformed from consequential injuries into invasions
of property rights." r Damage to abutters from the presence of
the New York elevated railways was called a "taking" of or
from easements of light, air and access from the street. Just
compensation was fairly conceived-illogically, however, since
injury by noise and vibration was theoretically not compensable
-as the whole amount by which the market value of abutting
property was diminished.7
3 For a comparatively recent expression of such resentment see Tuo:mAs
BATY, VICARIOUS LIL .rr- (1916).
4 Blackburn, J. in Hammersmith etc. Ry. v. Brand, L. R., 4 H. L. 171, 19G
(1869).
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. 13 Wall. 166 U. S. (1871), described in
Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U. S. 635, 642 (1878), as perhaps "the
extremest qualification of the doctrine" that "acts done in the proper ex-
ercise of governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private
property, are universally held not to be a taking."1
6Finch, J., dissenting in American Bank Note Co. v. N. Y. El. Ry.x
129 N. Y. 252, 271, 29 N. E. 302, 307 (1891).
7 For citations, see Comment, supra star footnote, notes 7-9.
The compensation was conceived as for damage continuing throughout
perpetuity. This is artificial. The damage was no more perpetual than the
compensation; nor was it expected to be. The practical object and effect
were to relieve the then owners, forthwith, from the shock of an artificial
change too sharp and sudden to be absorbed naturally without undue
hardship. If the $200,000 had not done it immediately, less than half a
century of time would have brought abutting owners into a relation to
a perpetual elevated railway as if to a roaring stream established by nature.
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Though in form the liability thus imposed was quasi-con-
tractual-as if the railway were unjustly enriched by property
had and received from the abutters-in substance it was quasi-
delictual. The moving considerations were the same as in cases
where tort liability is predicated not upon fault but upon appro-
priateness-employer's liability for the torts of his servants,
liability of careful keepers of dangerous animals or artificial
ponds for consequences of their escape, liability of newspaper
publishers for unintended non-negligent libels. In all these cases
the plaintiff is an innocent passive recipient of damage. The
defendant, relatively to the plaintiff, is an active agent; he is
at least the beneficiary and maintainer of something-servant,
pond, animal, newspaper, railway-but for which the damage
would not have occurred. And he is apt to be, although this is
not invariably so, in the better position to stand the loss, or to
re-coup by passing it on to the public.
It was not true8 that the presence of the elevated "took"
abutters' property. But it will not do to quarrel unduly with
legal artifice or fiction. By resort to it law often clumsily har-
monizes desirable stability with desirable change. It may be an
indispensable instrument for moving law towards justice-a
changing thing whose commands originate variably in subjec-
tive emotion,' deriving such objective validity as they can have
from concurrences of relatively disinterested feelings of right-
ness or expediency. But it is a dangerous instrumentality. The
vice of calling things out of their true names is that names tend
to be taken as things. So here. Once it is said that the railway
has taken and paid for property, it seems to follow that it
thenceforth owns the property it took-which will be thought
to have, like other property, market value and capacity to ap-
preciate.
The two New York courts which have passed upon the East
42d Street situation have felt bound by judicial usage to as-
sume that what the railway got for its payment of damages
was a property right having value to which the railway is en-
titled upon its condemnation. But the claim that it is worth
No owner in 1920, however he might stand to benefit from its abatement,
would have been sustaining damage from its presence.
Had it not been felt necessary to describe the transaction as compensa-
tion for the taking of property, it might accurately have been said, not
that the railway got "property rights" for its $200,000, but that, having
paid in full the damage it inflicted, it was forever immune from further
.claims therefor.
8 The conception of truth is of course not absolute but pragmatic. "The
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market." Holmes, J., dissenting in Abrams v. United
States, 250 U. S. 616, 630, 40 Sup. Ct. 17, 22 (1919). That damage to




$3,600,000 for destruction as useless, because that would now
be its cost new for use, to a user who had to have it, has not
been and cannot be taken seriously. That any payment to its
owner should condition the destruction of useless property hav-
ing much quality as nuisance is indeed strange; cities often re-
quire owners of rubbish to dispose of it at their own expense.
Yet both courts awarded as the value of the railway's prop-
erty right sums which are small only in comparison with the sum
demanded. The court of first instance, "taking into considera-
tion" (along with other things equally without significance) both
"original cost" ($200,000) and "present cost of reproduction"
($3,600,000), and "giving more weight" to the former than to
the latter, found that the "fair market value" was $750,000.P
Such a taking into consideration would as well sustain any award
between $200,000 and $1,700,000. And if irrelevancies were
eliminated instead of taken into consideration, and the effort
were to find a moral equivalent for market value where there is
no market, the award could have been anything from zero to say
$3,000,000. For a "willing seller" ought reasonably to be glad
to get anything at all-if only relief from unprofitable operation.
A "willing buyer," on the other hand, might reasonably pay any
price, however extortionate, which would still leave him bene-
fited by the destruction. The Appellate Division award of what
was judicially determined to be the value of the property at
the time the railway acquired it ($200,000) '" has at least the
merit of a definite basis. But it is equally arbitrary. For the
value, if any, at the present time has no demonstrable relation
to the value then.
Arbitrary though they are as valuations of property, both
these awards seem to have upon another theory a less unrea-
sonable unexpressed foundation. The abutting property is felt
as unjustly enriched by the $200,000 which the railway was
made to pay in a former century. The payment was for a
property right in perpetuity. The fraction of perpetuity for
which it has been enjoyed is so tiny as to be negligible; the
failure of consideration is virtually total. The conclusion that
the railway should have back its $200,000 is further supported
by the sense that an actual, though unexpressed, inducement
of the requirement of that payment was expectation then rea-
sonable, that the railway by prosperous operation would be
able to re-coup its payment, or at least earn interest on it. That
has turned out to be a mistake of fact." The difference between
9 126 Mlisc. at 912, 216 N. Y. Supp. at 34.
10 229 App. Div. at 628-9, 243 N. Y. Supp. at 679.
11 The conclusion may find further support in the very general feeling-
in fact prevalent, though not altogether accurate-that the damages for
which the railway had to pay $200,000 were not in fact sustained. The
abutters were unquestionably injured for a time. But for the compensa-
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the sums awarded by the two courts may be accounted for as
follows. The Appellate Division would restore to the railway
only its bare principal; while it was operating the spur it had
opportunity to earn a return upon its capital expenditure for
damages. The lower court, however, would (though it may be
necessary to repeat that it expressed itself otherwise) add in-
terest to the restored principal; for if the $200,000 went into
the abutting real estate and is still there, it has been earning
interest while the railway capital starved. $200,000 with inter-
est at 6%, uncompounded, for forty-five years (only an approxi-
mation of the actual period) is $740,000; the award was $750,-
000.
This theory, not of the value of property, but of the equitable
right to get back, with or without interest, a payment, made under
a mistake of fact, or for which the expected consideration has
failed, seems the most reasonable, and may well have been the
actual, basis of the decisions of the two lower courts. Of course
it is artificial. It substitutes the theory that the payment was
for damage in perpetuity for the fact that it was for transitory
hardship pending readjustment.12 It rests upon presumption
that the $200,000 actually went into the real estate, and is still
there, or that ownership has been unchanged since the payment.
Such presumptions, often practically convenient, are so deep
in our habits of law and thought that we resist recognition that
they are contrary to fact. It might be otherwise here if the
abutting land had in fact steadily depreciated since 1880.
Deeper than this habit of legal thought as a crypto-deter-
minant of any substantial award to the railway is sympathy.
The $3,600,000 descending upon East 42d Street with the re-
moval of the elevated spur has the quality of manna from heaven.
The moral claim of the abutters rests mainly on the fact that
we are used to seeing unearned value accrue to ownership of
land, and can see in general nowhere that it may more appropri-
ately go. Here, however, there is strong feeling that some
tion many of them might have been financially ruined. But appreciation
due to urban growth stimulated by the elevated is believed to have very
quickly made them more than whole. Failure of their property to appre-
ciate as rapidly as neighboring property in streets not cluttered by the
elevated was not a damage. After appreciation had made good their
temporary loss, they had been doubly compensated for it, and it was
then as if the finding that they had been damaged had been a mistake of
fact.
12 See note 7 supra. Feeling that the termination within fifty years of
the "perpetual" property right results in a failure of the consideration for
the payment made therefdr, ignores the measure actually used for valuing
the property right "in perpetuity"--diminution of market value of abutting
land at the time of the payment. Analysis of "market value" by economists
shows that in general "the value of land in perpetuity is the capitalized
income for less than half a century." Comment, supra note 1, note 10.
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of it may appropriately go to the railway. This feeling may
be supported in either quasi-contractual or quasi-delictual lan-
guage. It may be said that the railway is impoverished by that
which has enriched the abutters-the competing subway. Or
it may be said, with considerable analogy to the actual consider-
ations which induced the award to the former abutters, that
the railway now, like the abutters then, is an innocent passive
sufferer of loss due to a new man-made condition. The abutters
are beneficiaries of the change. They are in a relatively good
position to stand an assessment towards the relief of the loss
and take indemnity from the future.1 3
These facts, unhappily, do not quite make a case for either
quasi-contractual or quasi-delictual recovery. Without resort to
the fiction that the abutters have the $200,000 which was paid
to their predecessors, or to the theory (discussed infra) of the
March comment, no definite amount of their enrichment can be
seen as in equity owed by them to the railway. No act or
activity of theirs bears causal responsibility for any part of the
railway's loss; they do not maintain the subway. Appropri-
ate though it is that they should contribute for the railway's
relief, there seems no way to liquidate an amount which they-
a mere handful out of thousands of beneficiaries of improved
rapid transit-may appropriately be required to contribute. The
notion of enforcement by law of contributions whose just amount
is as unmeasureable as that of gifts to the Red Cross or a Com-
munity Chest cannot but give pause.
That, however, is what any substantial award to the railway
would really amount to-unless upon the theory of the Alarch
comment. That theory involves no covert abandonment of the
"property" premise. Though it gives the same result it avoids
the absurdity of posing cost of reproduction as the measure of
the fair purchase price of a useless commodity. It rests upon a
scrupulous fidelity to the view of property as "a bundle of
rights," and a literal conception of the property acquired by the
railway as precisely identical with that lost by the abutters. The
13 The situation of the holders of depreciated elevated railway bond also
moves to sympathy with the railway claim. The social interest in stimulat-
ing investment in public utilities has not, indeed, been without weight in
law. But when private capital will not flow for improved transit in
New York, the public credit is now-a-days available. Any scintilla of
force in the interest in encouraging private investment seems less than
that of another public interest-that in removal of elevated structures
from the streets as fast as their usefulness is superseded. The removal
of the East 42d Street spur was induced by the supposed pecuniary interests
of the abutters. Comment, svpra note 1, note 30. The promptness of
future removals will be materially influenced by the substantiality which
those pecuniary interests turn out to have. Pending determination of this,
the Sixth Avenue Association has suspended its efforts to bring about the
removal of elevated structures on that street. Ibid., note 18.
19311 1079
YALE LAW JOURNAL
abutters' original bundle of rights included freedom from effects
such as those caused by elevated structures in the street. For
subtraction of this freedom from their bundle they were paid
in full. The railway thenceforth owned in fee the freedom sub-
tracted. It could possess and use that freedom only negatively,
by maintaining the spur. While the spur stood, the freedom
was as if locked in the railway's safe. But upon removal of the
spur, possession and use of the freedom revert to the abutters;
and the $3,600,000 increase in value seems superficially to accrue
to their bundle of rights, being merged in its value. Owner-
ship, however, is not dependant upon possession. The increase
is due, specifically, to the enjoyment by abutting land of free-
dom from effects of elevated structures-a landed interest in
which the railway's, not the abutters', capital is invested. "The
accrual of unearned increment in a landed interest ordinarily
redounds to the one whose capital has been invested therein."
The $3,600,000 should therefore go to the railway, not as a
price for its interest, but as appreciated capital belonging to it,
by which the abutters will otherwise be unjustly enriched.
Assuming the premise that for its $200,000 the railway
got, not mere immunity from further claims for the damages it
had made good, but rather property which it had taken, the logic
of this is impregnable. It is the only theory upon which the
railway's property interest may be conceived as having a value
separable from railway use. Yet its adoption would be shocking.
For it can hardly be felt as just, even by strong sympathy with
the railway, that payment to one generation of abutters of
their damage from a public utility should give the proprietor
of what has become a public nuisance a right to collect from
another generation of abutters the entire pecuniary value which
otherwise result to them from its abatement. Ordinary feelings
revolt at the subjugation by fiat-property of what is felt as
property-in-fact.
The alternatives are: (1) an award of a lesser amount whose
least unreasonable basis involves covert admission that it is
not in fact a valuation of property; (2) an award of nothing at
all-which might be expressed either as a valuation of the rail-
way's property right as worthless, or a denial that it owns such a
thing.
The situation of the owners and mortgagees of New York
elevated railways is not unlike that of workmen thrown out of
employment by improved machinery. They have done useful
service. A substantial award for their relief might be hailed
with satisfaction if, like the award of the abutters of the eighties,
it could be felt as an illogical recognition in law of realities
of justice, pointing, however gropingly, towards surer mitigation
than through charity of the hardships of so-called progress.
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Here, however, the beneficiaries of progress who might justly be
assessed for the railway's relief are so numerous, and an assess-
ment of the abutters only would be so discriminatory, that as
between them and the railway it cannot be felt that justice com-
mands that it be made. And the tendency of an award, in form,
of value, where there is no true measure of true value, and the
thing valued is "property" only by judicial fiat, cannot be con-
sidered without misgivings.
In the history of every legal fiction there comes a time when
abuse, or danger of it, outweighs its use. The beneficial results
of its adoption can by then stand on their own legs. We should
not now, for example, shrink from frankly quasi-delictual re-
covery for damages caused by public improvements. It would be
pleasant to see the fiction of a resulting property right disappear-
perhaps not all at once, since readjustments would be complicated.
But deception, even with benign intentions, weaves tangled webs.
That extrication of fact from fiction, requiring the true grounds
of decision to step out into day-light, makes justice clearer and
its effectuation more sure, is as true as it is trite.14
V. N.
PREREQUISITES TO SUITS BY STOCKHOLDERS OF DIS-
SOLV7ED CORPORATIONS
WHILE the prerequisites to a stockholder's representative action
brought during the life of a corporation are well settled, uncer-
tainty arises with regard to the pertinence of these require-
ments after the corporation has been dissolved. The rules which
require stockholders before suing on a right of the corporation
to exhaust all means of action through the corporation itself,
and, failing to secure such action, to join the corporation as a
party defendant, are justified by both business and legal ex-
pediency., The conduct of litigation, as well as the exercise of
' 3Perhaps the courts could not unsnarl the tangle made by a life-time
of misnomer without statutory aid. The railway's "property" in sub-
traction from enjoyment of abutting property has, for example, been
held to be taxable. A denial that what was taxed is property might seem
retroactively to invalidate taxation whose validity has been adjudicated.
Yet if the railway's capital expenditure for damages were so called, in-
stead of mis-called "property," would not justice with respect to its
taxation become more clear? Or if the question were of a rate-base,
it surely would be better to determine as sifch a fair return upon
capital expenditure for damages, and perhaps a fair rate of amortization
for such capital, than to fumble for the value from time to time of a per-
petual property constructively created by the expenditure.
'See generally COOK, CORPORATIoNs (8th ed. 1923) §§ 735, 738, 740,
750, 751; 1 CLARK & MARSHALL, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1903) § 538, also
SUPPLEAENT (1908) § 538; 3 PO.EROY, EQurry JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed.
1931] COMMENTS 1081
1082 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40
discretion as to embarking upon litigation, must ordinarily be
left to those authorized to represent the corporate entity and
manage its affairs. It is only in the abnormal situation, usually
involving wrongful acts on the part of officers, that courts of
equity, looking beyond the legal entity to the stockholders as
owners, permit them to sue on a right of the corporation because
there is no other way of protecting their interests.- In these
cases the presence of the corporation as a defendant is esssential,
both that it may be heard before its right is adjudicated and that
it may be bound by the result.3 These reasons apply even where
it may prove impossible to bring the corporation in any manner
before a court having jurisdiction of the other defendants and
where, as a consequence, the complainants may be left without
any forum in which to pursue their remedy.- But the concepts
of a right of action, and of an opportunity to be heard and of
being concluded by a judgment, all postulate a legal personality
capable of asserting that right, of appearing in court, and of
being restrained from a course of action which it might other-
wise pursue. As corporate existence becomes impaired, there-
fore, the requirements for suits based on rights of the corpora-
tion may be relaxed or become wholly inapplicableY
1918) § 1095; (1931) 15 MINN. L. REv. 453. In the federal courts, by Equity
Rule 27, the bill must set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff
to secure action on the part of the directors or trustees, and, if necessary, of
the shareholders, and the causes of failure to obtain it, or reasons for not
making such efforts. 28 U.S.C.A., § 723.
2 Where the directors or others qualified to act are themselves a party to
the wrongful acts, so that it would be useless to call upon them to act,
plaintiffs are not required to go through the idle form of a demand. Har-
rison v. Thomas, 112 Fed. 22 (C. C. A. 5th, 1901); Burrows v. Inter-
]borough Co., 156 Fed. 389 (C. C. S. D. N. Y., 1907); Price v. Union Land
Co., 187 Fed. 886 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911); Ross v. Quinnesec, 227 Fed. 337
(C. C. A. 6th, 1915); Von Arnim v. American Tube Works, 188 Mass.
515, 74 N. E. 680 (1905); Freeman v. Mitchell, 198 Mich. 207, 164 N. W.
445 (1917).
3 Since the action when maintained rests on the ground that a right of
the corporation is involved, and since it does not appear as plaintiff, it
must be made a defendant. City of Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall 626
(U. S. 1873).
- Eldred v. American Palace Car, 105 Fed. 457 (C. C. A. 3d, 1900) ; Min-
nesota v. Northern Securities Co., 184 U. S. 199, 22 Sup. Ct. 308 (1902);
Hyams v. Old Dominion Co., 204 Fed. 681 (D. Me. 1913).
S Thompson v. Stanley, 20 N. Y. Supp. 317 (Sup. Ct. 1892)
(corporation having done no business and elected no officers for a number
of years, entire control in defendant, stockholder may bring representative
action without demanding action by corporation); Tennessee Mountain
Petroleum & Mining Co. v. Ayers, 43 S. W. 744 (Tenn. 1897) (corporation
having done no business for twenty years, officers unknown, stockholders
recover in ejectment "for the use and benefit of the corporation and share-
holders"); of. Dill v. Johnston, 72 Okla. 149, 179 Pac. 608 (1919) (business
discontinued and all assets conveyed by president to himself, plaintiff,
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An extinct corporation, like a dead man, is without standing
in court,6 but whether a dissolved corporation is to be deemed
extinct turns upon the existence of statutes continuing corporate
existence for purposes of suit and settlement., When a statute
continues a corporation for a fixed number of years only, it is
thereafter held to be absolutely defunct;s but when no time limit
is specified a problem of construction may arise0 The position
of stockholders of a corporation whose existence is thus con-
tinued is similar to that of stockholders in a going concern. Ac-
cordingly they are required, before suing, to exhaust all the pos-
sibilities of remedy through those who are authorized to repre-
sent the corporation. 0 But if there are no officers or directors
qualified to act in its behalf, and if there is no statute which
provides a procedure to meet the situation, a stockholders' bill
may be the only effective remedy, and such a bill has been al-
lowed."'
In the recent case of Watts v. Vanderbilt,2 minority stock-
holders of a New Jersey corporation brought suit in New York
being the only other stockholder, may bring action in his own behalf).
See (1924) 8 MINN. L. REv. 348.
; 6Mumma v. Potomac Co., 8 Pet. 281 (U. S. 1834); Pendleton v. Russell,
144 U. S. 640, 12 Sup. Ct. 743 (1892); Greeley v. Smith, Fed. Cas. No.
5748 (C. C. D. Me. 1845).
72 CLARK & MA XSHL, supra note 1, § 549.
s Dundee Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Hughes, 77 Fed. 855 (C. C. D. Ore.
1896).
9 Under a statute which provides for continuing corporations for the
purpose of winding up their affairs and which lays upon the directors
the duty of speedy settlement, it has been held that two years is ordinarily
a sufficient time for winding up, following the interpretation of statutes
pertaining to the settlement of estates of deceased persons. Ewald Iron
Co. v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 692, 131 S. W. 774 (1910); 142 Ky. 465,
134 S. W. 481 (1911). The pertinence of this analogy was acknowledged
by a federal court in a case involving the right of stockholders of a Ken-
tucky corporation ten years dissolved to bring an action in ejectment. The
court allowed the action, holding that the legal title to the property was
then in the stockholders but not omitting to note as relevant to this con-
clusion the absence of corporate debts. Stearns Coal Co. v. Van Winkle,
221 Fed. 590 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915).
10 Taylor v. Holmes, 127 U. S. 489, 8 Sup. Ct. 1192 (1888).
1 Crumlish's Adm'r v. Shenandoah Valley R. R. Co., 28 W. Va. 623
(1886). In the federal courts, where Equity Rule 27 requires that the
plaintiff stockholder go to the extent, "if necessary," of attempting to
secure action through other stockholders, it is not certain that this would
be insisted upon in the case of a dissolved corporation. See Taylor v.
Holmes, supra, note 10, at 492, 8 Sup. Ct. at 1193; Watts. v. Vanderbilt,
45 F. (2d) 968, 970 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930). For a criticism of the require-
ment as impractical and superfluous, see BALLANTINE, PRVATE COaRPOM-
TIONS (1927); 189, see also 4 COOK, CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 740;
(1931) 15 MINN. L. Rv. at 462.
-2Supra note 11; aff'g Watts v. Alexander Morrison & Co., 34 F. (2d)
66 (E. D. N. Y. 1929).
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against certain stockholders alleged to have dominated and con-
trolled the corporation, charging that they fraudulently caused
it to be placed in receivership and its assets to be sold. The
suit was brought five years after the receivership. The corpora-
tion was joined as a defendant, and the relief asked was that the
defendants, other than the Corporation, account to it for the
losses caused by their illegal acts. The principal defendant, a
citizen of New York, removed the suit to the federal court, where
it was dismissed primarily on the ground that the corporation
was an indispensable party which could not be served in New
York.13  On appeal it was contended that the cdrporation was
not an indispensable party since it had been dissolved by the
state for non-payment of taxes. By statute in New Jersey, how-
ever, the existence of a corporation is continued after dissolu-
tion for the purposes of suit; 14 and the directors are continued
as trustees to wind up its affairs, although the court of chancery,
on proper application by a stockholder or creditor, may appoint
a receiver to act as trustee for this purpose.15 The dismissal
was affirmed without prejudice to a new suit after the plaintiffs
should have exhausted their remedies through the corporation,
or its liquidating trustees, or receiver.
Under the circumstances of the case the effect of the decision
is apparently to compel the plaintiffs to invoke in New Jersey
the statutory provision for a receiver. Such a course should
no doubt be required in the case of a dissolved corporation hav-
ing assets still to be administered. On the other hand, if the
case were one where complaining stockholders alone would bene-
fit by a recovery, and if they desired to proceed directly against
the real defendants wherever found, there would seem to be
no practical reason for resuscitating the corporation through
the appointment of an official spokesman. 7 Here, however, as
13 Also on the ground that the suit involved a collateral attack upon
decrees entered in receivership proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction,
141 N. J., Comp. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1925) § 47-53.
15 Ibid. § 47-54, 55, 56.
16 The opinion reads: "The plaintiffs have not alleged facts which show
their right to bring this suit. If dissolution be disregarded, then they
were obliged to appeal to the shareholders, there being no directors, or to
excuse their failure to do so; if dissolution be noticed, they were obliged
to appeal to the liquidating trustees, or to a receiver appointed under the
New Jersey statute, or excuse their failure to do so." It is not clear from
the allegations of the bill whether there are directors who would be qualified
to serve as trustees, but the implication is that there are not. The bill
alleged that the defendants had assumed all the functions of the board, that
the board has not functioned for over five years, and that there is no
existing board.
-7 "For purpose of mere recovery of the corporate property from an ad-
versary party there was no imperative necessity for the appointment of
a receiver or trustee to act as representative plaintiff." See Stearns Coal
Co. v. Van Winkle, supra note 9, at 595. "Whatever of trust there is arises
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the court points out, creditors' claims are not yet barred by the
statute of limitations, and the record of the lower court dis-
closes that in the receivership settlement creditors received only
40 per cent of their claims. In the event that such adverse claims
should revive to dispute the stockholders' right to any sums
recovered, it might well be considered that the affairs of the
corporation had not been "wound up" and that simplicity of
administration would be attained by having some trust ma-
chinery reconstituted in New Jersey in the name of the corpora-
tion. In any event a means has been provided by which corpora-
tions may, in the discretion of the chancellor, 5 be equipped with
instruments to sue and be sued, and, in view of the certainty and
protection which would be afforded to all concerned by resort to
this procedure, the requirement that plaintiffs exhaust this pos-
sible means of relief is amply justified.
, If, however, a receiver should be refused by the chancellor and
the stockholders should perfect their status as parties plaintiff
by showing that all possibilities of remedy except a direct suit
have proved unavailing, a new obstacle confronts them in the
requirement that the corporation, as an indispensable party not
appearing as plaintiff, must be made a party defendant.'9  On the
present appeal the contention that the corporation, being dis-
solved, was no longer an indispensable party to the action was
considered at length and adversely determined on the state
of facts before the court.2  Yet in three previous
federal cases in which this question has been pre-
sented the contention of the plaintiffs was sustained,
though for varying reasons. In Eriin v. Orcgano2 minority
stockholders sued to recover their proportionate share of assets
from the peculiar and diverse equitable rights of the stockholders as against
the corporation in its property and their conditional liability to its credit-
ors." See Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U. S. 371, 383, 14 Sup.
Ct. 127, 130 (1893) (referring to assets of insolvent corporation).
'8 The authority of the chancellor to interpose is a discretionary power
to be exercised only on showing of need that the court interfere for the
protection of creditors or stockholders. Newfoundland Ry. Const. Co. v.
Schack, 40 N. J. Eq. 222, Atl. 23 (1885).
ID The apparent impossibility of bringing the corporation before the court
was a ground of dismissal in the lower court, the point of the dissolution
of the corporation not having been raised at that time. Watts v. Alex-
ander Mlorrison & Co. supra note 12. The situation would be otherwise
if the receiver had not been discharged, as it is well within the power
of a court of equity appointing a receiver to order him to appear in litiga-
tion elsewhere. Porter v. Sabin, 149 U. S. 473, 13 Sup. Ct. 1008 (1892);
CoNFLIcT OF LAWS, RESTATEMENT, § (Am. L. Inst. 1926) 100.
2, Concerning the authorities cited by plaintiffs for the proposition that
in actions by the shareholders of a dissolved corporation, the corporation is
not an indispensable party, the court concludes that "none of them sustain
any such broad doctrine." Watts v.Vanderbilt, stepra note 11, at 971.
-120 Fed. 577 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1884).
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of a dissolved corporation alleged to have been fraudulently
transferred to a new corporation organized by majority stock-
holders. The opinion pointed out that the corporation, if it
were a party and if the sale of property were set aside, would
be merely a "dry trustee" to divide the property among the
stockholders, and held that such a trustee, incapable of disputing
the title, does not constitute an indispensable party. In Gardiner
v. Automatic Arms Co. 2 2 and McClean v. Bradley 23 the actions
grew out of the transfer of assets and patents from a New Jersey
corporation subsequently dissolved to new corporations organized
by certain of its directors. The first suit was against the new
corporations to void the assignment of patents and for an ac-
counting, and the second against the former directors asking
similar relief. In the Gardiner case it was conceded that to re-
quire the corporation to be made a party would defeat jurisdic-
tion. The court relied on the consideration that, all creditors
being barred by the passage of ten years since dissolution, the
title to the corporate property had passed to the stockholders, and
that the chief reason for holding the corporation to be an in-
dispensable party, namely, to bind the title to the property,
had therefore ceased to exist. The court also considered the ef-
fect of Section 55 of the New Jersey statute concerning liquidat-
ing trustees, also involved in the Watts case, and concluded that
in the absence of express stipulation or binding interpretation
it should not be construed as prohibiting suits by stockholders
when necessary to protect their interests. The necessity of first
appealing for the appointment of a receiver was not discussed.
Similarly in the McClean case the court treated the suit as one by
stockholders in their own right and not as a derivative action.4
Yet certainly the cause of action, namely the alleged fraudulent
conveyance, was originally that of the corporation and would still
be so if the corporation had sufficient vitality to assert it. By
disregarding the theoretical continuance of the corporation, how-
ever, and looking at the stockholders as the only substantial
parties concerned, the court was able to deal with the complaint
22 275 Fed. 697 (D. N. Y. 1921).
23 282 Fed. 1011 (N. D. Ohio 1922). In an earlier case involving a dis-
solved New Jersey corporation continued for purposes of suit, a stock-
holders' and creditors' bill to set aside a sale of property was allowed, with
the direction that on trial "it will be better to bring the said corporation
before the court." Boyd v. Hankinson, 92 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 4th, 1899).
24 Cf. Southern Pacific v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 39 Sup. Ct. 533 (1913)
(accounting demanded from a majority stockholder for a proportionate
share of stock constituting proceeds from transfer of assets to a new cor-
poration; corporation held not an indispensable nor even a proper party
where purpose is to hold defendant as a trustee for plaintiffs individually) ;
Lawrence v. Southern Pacific, 180 Fed. 822 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1910) (sanie





State courts also have not always required a dissolved corpora-
tion to be made a party, as, for example, when the defendants
are directors or other officers qualified by statute to sue or be
sued on behalf of the corporation ;25 when there are no creditors
and the plaintiff stockholder is the only person entitled to benefit
by a recovery ;26 and even when there are creditors but the cor-
poration is without officers capable of acting and the assets
sought are in the hands of a defendant within the state.-7
These cases indicate that a statute continuing a dissolved
corporation for purposes of suit and liquidation does not neces-
sarily have the effect of making the corporation an indispensa-
ble party to a stockholders' suit on a right which it might once
have asserted as its own. The period during wlch its ghostly
personality can be usefully invoked is not likely to extend be-
yond the time where there is a possible conflict of interest be-
tween creditors and stockholders. The object of continuing a
dissolved corporation with capacity to sue and be sued is
to accomplish just results among palties having substantial
interests which survive, and the reason for the rule fails
when the only effect of insistence upon it is to obstruct
or defeat an action by such parties. The New Jersey
court, taking into account all possible interests, might on
application appoint a receiver and thus create an in-
strument to prosecute an action for the dissolved corporation.
It does not follow, however, that if such assistance is refused
a new bill coming before the federal court should be dismissed
for lack of the corporation as an indispensable party. If credit-
ors are then still concerned their situation will not be improved
by barring stockholders from an action in the only forum which
has jurisdiction over those charged with having injured the
corporation.28
- General Railway Signal Co. v. Cade, 122 App. Div. 100, 106 N. Y.
Supp. 729 (4th Dep't 1907); Atlantic Dredging Co. v. Beard, 203 N. Y.
584, 96 N. E. 415 (1911).
28 Ward v. Graham-Jones Mlotor Co., 74 Colo. 145, 219 Pac. 770 (1923);
cf. Dill v. Johnston, mapra, note 5.
27 Cruimlish's Adm'r v. Shenandoah Valley R. R. Co., supra note 11;
cf. Rogers v. Adriatic Fire Ins. Co., 148 N. Y. 34, 42 N. E. 515 (1895)
(a state may permit suit against dissolved foreign corporations but cannot
by its judgment render a corporation in New York alive as to foreign judg-
ment creditor though dead as to New York creditors).
218 It should be noted that the relief asked in the Watts case is an account-
ing to the corporation for the losses caused it by the illegal acts of the
defendants. The plaintiffs, therefore, invoke the corporate entity at the
same time that they argue that, being dissolved, it is not an indispensable
party. There is no allegation that defendants have acquired any of the
assets of the dissolved corporation. A further difficulty, distinguishing
the Watts case from the others discussed, is that the losses are alleged
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PRACTICAL OPERATION OF COURT RULES ON COMMIS-
SION CONTROL OF PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING
COMPANIES
IN considering the effect of the operations of holding companies
upon rates to the consumer, commentators have lamented the
restrictions imposed by the Supreme Court upon the regulatory
powers of the commissions.1 Overemphasizing the extent to
which actual control has been governed by a strict application
of these rules, they have concluded that effective regulation can
be attained only by their drastic revision.2 Viewed in the light
of court doctrines alone, however, the picture is incomplete. The
conflict between the courts and commissions is manifest; 3 yet
to have been caused by a fraudulent receivership. The case was dimissed
in the District court on the ground, not only that the corporation was an
indispensable party, but that the bill involved a collateral attack upon
receivership decrees in the United States court, District of New Jersey.
The Circuit Court of Appeals has refrained from considering whether this
objection would be fatal. In view of the fact that not only stockholders
and creditors but all persons involved in the receivership proceedings might
be affected by an action based on an allegation of fraud and collusion in
obtaining the receivership, the insistence that plaintiffs exhaust fully all
normal means of having the corporation appear in the action through an
official representative seems abundantly justified.
1A holding company is not a utility an4 is therefore not subject to
regulation. See Lilienthal, Regulation of Public Utility Holding Com-
panies (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 404, 409. An attempt is made in the Note
(1931) 44 HARv. L. Ruv. 833, 835-6, to work out a basis for jurisdiction
over the foreign holding company, but it would seem that Mr. Lilienthal's
conclusion that at present there is no valid way to serve process is emin-
ently sound. See Lilienthal, Recent Developments in the Law of Publio
Utility Holding Companies (1931) 31 COL. L. Ray. 189, 205-6. Further-
more, commission control of contract by a parent with its subsidiaries have
until recently been confined to "close scrutiny." Houston v. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co., 259 U. S. 318, 42 Sup. Ct. 486 (1922); Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct.
544 (1923). And a commission may not substitute its judgment for that
of the board of directors of a utility, even though it be a subsidiary without
independent volition. Re New York Rapid Transit Corp., P. U. R. 1928
B 274 (N. Y. Transit Comm. 1927) and cases there cited.
2 See Lilienthal, op. cit. supra note 1; Note (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 833;
Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J. 809.
3 The attitude of many commissions seems fairly reflected by the following
quotations: "What purpose does 'strict scrutiny' serve if the result thereof
may not, in any event, affect contract stipulation?" Re Michigan Bell
Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1926 C, 607, 610 (Mich. Pub. Util. Comm. 1926).
"If the expense of managing a utility be pyramided in this fashion (i. e.
through holding companies) then the benefit to be derived from regulation
is impaired if not entirely destroyed." Re Cumberland and Allegheny Gas
Co. P. U. R. 1928 B, 20, 77 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1927). Cf. Re Now
England Telephone and Telegraph Co., P. U. R. 1926 E, 186, 197 (N. H.
Pub. Sere. Comm. 1926) where the commission said, ". . . we considered
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the preponderance of commission decisions never reach the
courts for review. 4 Thus the practical efficacy of the Supreme
Court rules can only be ascertained by a consideration of the
insistent, frequently ingenious, and often rebellious efforts of the
commissions to avoid the hazards of holding company domina-
tion.
An examination of the commission cases involving holding
companies during the last five years 6 discloses that although
approximately one-third assent to the court rules either unre-
servedly 0 or under protest,7 the remainder have been able to
it essential to know how much profit the American Company was malting
out of this contract" (italics ours) but after counsel for the utility had
'called the Commission's attention to recent decisions by the Supreme Court'
it concluded 'it was apparent that there was no legal way in which this
information could be obtained."
4 Of the cases herein considered only about 20% reached the courts, while
in approximately one-half of the remaining 80% the utility won its point
and hence had no reason to appeal. The great majority of these were
telephone cases antedating the Smith case, infra notes 32 and 33. Cf. the
letter of Chairman Attwill in REPORT OF THE MASSACHUS-TTS SPECIL CO'It-
MISSION ON CONTROL AND CONDUCT OF PTDmLic UTirriEs (1929) 221, 223: "In
an experience in regulation of very nearly half a century, Massachusetts has
regulated its electric public utilities according to its own traditions, with
but two appeals to the court, neither of which was successful."
5 The cases considered in this survey are taken from P. U. R. 1925 A
through P. U. R. 1930 C. They may be grouped into those in which the
commission (1) assents to the court rule in question (155), (2) assents
but resents the necessity for so doing or disclaims any responsibility
(17M9%), (3) assents to the rule but distinguishes it to effect a purpose
(55%), or, (4) flatly rejects court authority (12i1%).
6For examples of unreserved assent, wherein the commission has
failed completely to reach the holding company, see, Re Southern Pacific
Motor Transport Co., P. U. R. 1929 A 193 (Cal. R. R. Comm. 1928); Re
Bernardo, P. U. R. 1929 B 497 (Cal. R. R. Comm. 1928); Wood v. Elmira
Water, Light & R. R. Co., P. U. R. 1927 B 400 (N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm.
1926); Re Borough of Brookville P. U. R. 1929 D 483 (Pa. Pub. Serv.
Comm. 1929). The foregoing are all cases of refusal to disregard a sub-
sidiary's identity. See Comment (1931) 40 Yale L. J. 809, 811. Brookville
v. Solar Electric Co., P. U. R. 1928 B, 621 (Pa. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1928)
represents a failure due to a defective statute. But cf. the telephone cases,
infra note 7.
7Re Indiana Bell Telephone Company, P. U. R. 1926 C, 785 (Ind. Pub.
Serv. Comm. 1926) (original order in P. U. R. 1924 A, 1 (1923) was enjoined
in 300 Fed. 190 (D. Ind. 1924); Public Service Commissioner Chesapeake &
Potomac Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1925 E, 345 (Ind. Pum. Serv. Comm. 1925);
Re New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., P. U. Ri., 1925 E 739 (Mass.
Dept. Pub. Util. 1925) ; Re Michigan Bell Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1926 C, 607
(Mich. Pub. Util. Comm. 1926) ; Re New England Telephone and Telegraph
P. U. R. 1926 B 247 (Me. Pub. Serv. Comm 1925); Re New England Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co., P. U. R. 1926 E 186 (N. H. Pub. Serv. Comm.
1926); Re New York Telephone Co. 1926 E, 1 (N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm.
1926); Re New York Telephone Co. P. U. R. 1926 E, 1 (N. Y. Pub. Serv.
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extend the scope of their control beyond the strict limits thus
established. In a few instances, commissions have even accom-
plished this by the precarious expedient of refusing outright to
apply the Supreme Court rules. The Wisconsin commission, for
example, has succeeded in lowering rates in investigations under-
taken on its own motion by adopting the forbidden theory that
proof of value to a local utility is not sufficient to justify a fixed
charge on gross revenue as payment to a parent, in the absence
of a showing that the services paid for were actually performed
and proof of the cost to the parent of such performance."
Similarly in a telephone case the Commission argued that since
under the Supreme Court rule it could not declare the A. T. and
T. contract invalid without assuming the burden of proof, there
was logical justification for imposing the burden on the utility
of showing why, accompanying an increase in the rates of the
subsidiary, there should be an increased payment to the parent
for providing the same services.0 The New Jersey 10 and West
Virginia 1 commissions have reached the same result by requir-
ing the petitioning utilities before submitting management con-
tracts as an item of operating expense, to show the actual cost
to the holding company.1 2 In the analogous case of a projected
sale of bonds by the subsidiary to its parent, the New York
Commission, in denying permission, boldly delimited the Su-
preme Court rule that a commission may not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the board of directors by holding it inapplicable
where the practical identity of buyer and seller precluded auto-
nomous judgment by the directors of the subsidiary.13 Moreover,
two commissions have assumed jurisdiction over local companies
which would probably not be regarded as utilities under the
Supreme Court rule.-' In Missouri a hydroelectric generating
Comm. 1926); Re New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., P. U. R.
1927 C, 348 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1926).
8 Re Wisconsin Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1925 D 661 (Wis. R. R. Comm.
1925); Re Wisconsin Fuel and Light Co., P. U. R. 1927 E, 212 (Wis. R. R.
Comm. 1927); Re Wisconsin Public Utilities Co. P. U. R. 1930 A 119 (Wig.
R. R. Comm. 1929).
9 Re Wisconsin Telephone Co. supra note 8.
10 Re New York Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1925 C, 767 (N. T. Board of
Pub. Util. Comm. 1925).
W- Re Point Pleasant Natural Gas Co., P. U. R. 1927 B, 805 (W. Va.
Pub. Serv. Comm. 1927); Re Cumberland and Allegheney Gas Co., supra
note 3.
12 This none the less violated the Supreme Court rule which held that
cost to the parent was not an element of reasonableness. Houston v. South-
western Bell Telephone Co., Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public
Service Commission, supra note 1.
13 Re New York Rapid Transit Corp., supra note 1. The commission here
made the very faint distinction that it was protecting the rights of Now
York City.
14 See Lilienthal, op. cit. supra note 1, 29 COL. L. REv. at 409.
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concern, holding itself out to supply only distributing utilities,
one of which it owned,15 and in Indiana a domestic corporation
owned by four utilities to which it supplied power 1 were held
to be utilities for the purpose of regulating management and
equipment contracts. And in a similar situation the Texas com-
mission held that a supply company owned by the owner of the
petitioning distributihg company was a necessary party to the
proceedingsY. Nevertheless, despite a limited degree of success,
such procedure is clearly of dubious value as a method of extend-
ing commission control, since its efficacy is dependent entirely
upon failure of the utility to appeal to the courts.
In the majority of cases investigated, however, the commis-
sions have attained a considerable degree of control over holding
companies by various devices, which, while avoiding the effect
of the Supreme Court rules, do not fall directly within their
prohibition. The Colorado commission has successfully employed
conditional grants of certificates of convenience and necessity.
Thus in one instance, where an applicant sought to establish the
soundness of its proposed financial structure by means of a con-
tract whereby its foreign parent company promised to subscribe
for a certain amount of its stock, the commission, realizing its
inability to compel performance by the parent, granted a certifi-
cate conditioned on such performance.1s And when confronted
by a situation in which the applicant, a distributing gas com-
pany, had a twenty year supply contract over which the commis-
sion would have no jurisdiction because of its interstate char-
acter,19 this commission avoided the possibility of having to
accept the contract price as basic in the determination of future
rates by granting the certificate on condition that if the applicant
could in the future procure gas more cheaply elsewhere it would
do so.20 In Missouri a further opportunistic thrust at a holding
company was achieved when the commission held that a utility
15 Re West Missouri Power Co., P. U. R. 1929 A, 61 (Mo. Pub. Serv.
Comm. 1928). See Mo. Rsv. STAT. (1919 c. 95, § 10411.
'
0 Re State Line Generating Co., P. U. R. 1929 B, 97 (Ind. Pub. Serv.
Comm. 1928). See IND. AN. STAT. (Burns 1926) c. 94, § 12672. In both
this statute and the Missouri statute (supra note 15) it is attempted to
include within utility any corporation controlling a utility, but the courts
have held that this does not include a holding company. See Lilienthal,
op. cit. supra note 1, 29 CoL. L. REv. at 408-412.
17 Re Fort Worth Gas Co., P. U. R. 1929 A, 136 (Tex. R. R. Comm. 1928).
"Re Denver and Interurban Motor Co., P. U. R. 1927 E, 737 (Colo.
Pub. Util. Comm. 1927).
9 "For a review of the Supreme Court's decisions on when state commis-
sions may and may not regulate interstate contracts, see Public Utility
Commission v. Attleboro Steam and Elect. Co., 273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. CL
294 (1927).
20 Re Arkansas Valley Natural Gas Co., P. U. R. 1930 A, 454 (Colo.
Pub. Util. Comm. 1929).
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owned and supplied by a foreign corporation could not claim the
protection afforded to regulated monopolies, and therefore pro-
ceeded to grant a certificate of convenience and necessity to a
wholly domestic corporation empowered to compete with the
former utility.21
Moreover, jurisdiction over the purchase and sale of both
capital stock and assets of a utility, essential to the control of the
utility itself, has furnished an additional effective weapon in
dealing with holding companies. The Indiana Commission,
having expressed its attitude toward the American Bell Company
by saying that the 4y per cent contract "is quite unsatisfactory
to the Public Service Commission and is very objectionable to the
rate payers," 22 refused to permit an American Bell subsidiary to
purchase local telephone companies because such a purchase
would automatically extend the contract to the latter. 3 Later
this commission blocked another attempt of the A. T. and T. to
acquire independent Indiana telephone companies, this time work-
ing by devious means through the Illinois Bell Company and an
adjunct called The First Chicago Corporation, by finding that
a previous transaction in this scheme had violated a statute
requiring consent of the commission to the sale of a utility's
stock.24 The Pennsylvania, 2r New York, 20 and Maryland"
commissions have adopted the stand that whether or not a hold-
ing company shall be allowed to acquire voting stock in a utility
rests "solely in the sound discretion of the commission" and that
the only issue is whether such acquisition is in the public interest.
The Maryland commission was, however, ultimately thwarted
by a hostile court when it attempted to prevent a holding com-
pany from purchasing at an excessive price and thus avert the
danger that it would manipulate a rate increase to recoup itself.21
21Re Industrial Gas Co., P. U. R. 1929 A, 516 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm.
1928).
22 See Re )Citizens Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1926 E, 753, 759 (Ind. Pub.
Serv. Comm. 1926). For a severe indictment against promoter schemes
and holding companies see Re Associated Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1927 C,
577, 584-589 (Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1927).
23 Re Citizens Telephone Co., sutpra note 22.
2
'Re Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1928 B, 717 (Ind.
Pub. Serv. Comm. 1927).
2 5 Re Metropolitan Edison Co., P. U. R. 1927 E, 639 (Pa. Pub. Serv.
Comm. 1927).
20 Re Erie Power Corporation, P. U. R. 1926 A, 707 (N. Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm. 1925); Re Ridgfield Electric Co., P. U. R. 1925 D, 317 (N. Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm. 1925); Re Genesee Valley Gas Co. Inc., P. U. R. 1927 B, 600
(N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1926); Re New York Electric Co., P. U. R.
1928 D, 247 (N. Y. Dep't of Pub. Serv. 1928).
27 Re Elect. Public Utilities Co., P. U. R. 1927 E, 609 (Md. Pub. Serv.
Comm. 1927) (denial because, of lack of public interest).
28 See Lilienthal, op. cit. supra note 1, 29 CoL. L. Rnv. at 425, for the
course of this case, disposed of by the Maryland Circuit Court in Electric
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Thus by means of protest, rebellion, and evasion, the commis-
sions have indicated their perception of the limitations inherent
in the rules promulgated by the courts. That they are justified
in their dissatisfaction and are in harmony with current public
opinion is indicated by the numerous official investigations into
the status of the regulation of public utility holding companies
which have been recently suggested or undertaken. -9 A statutory
remedy alone can hardly be relied upon in view of the doubtful
applicability of state statutes to foreign holding companies,-9
and the probable vigorous protest against any proposed federal
legislation.31 One feasible method of attaining more compre-
hensive regulation is by an extension of indirect control along
Public Utilities Co. v. Public Service Commission, P. U. R. 1928 E, 854.
It would seem that Lilienthal minimizes a very real danger which should
be remedied by commission control. For a thorough discussion of the evils
of the holding company's relation to a determination of rates yielding a
fair return see Cohen, Confiscatory Rates and Modern Finance (1929) 39
YALE L. J. 151. Isolated examples of indirect control are: Re Eastport
Water Co., P. U. R. 1929 E, 136 (Me. Pub. Serv. Comm. 1929) (the court
rule was here turned against the utility by denying petition to consolidate
because company into which petitioners wished to consolidate was not
utility, its sole business having been to hold utility stocks) ; City of Polson
v. Public Utility Consolidated Corp., P. U. R. 1929 E 557 (Mlont. Pub. Serv.
Comm. 1929) (centralization of accounting refused where result would be
to remove records from the state); Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co.
of Virginia v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 147 Va. 43, 136 S. E. 575 aff'g
P. U. R. 1926 E, 481 (Va. State Corp. Comm. 1926).
29 SEN. REs. No. 83, 70th CONG. 1st SESS. authorizing an investigation
of electricity holding companies by the Federal Trade Commission; COUZENs
BILL, S. B. 3869, 71st CoNG. 2nd SEss.; REPORT OF INTERSTATE CoIM51nc-
CoMuMISSION TO CONGRESS, Dec. 4, 1930, United States Daily, Dec. 5, 1930,
at 1; REPORT OF MlASSACHUSETTS SPECIAL Coi inSSION ON CONTROL AND
CONDUCT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1930) 95-97; REPORT OF NEW YORK C05t5tus-
SION ON THE REVISION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMxISSIONS LW (1930)
26-28. A bill providing for thorough regulation of holding companies has
been passed by the Kansas Legislature and sent to the governor for ap-
proval. SENATE BIL 304 reported in United States Daily March 6, 1931, at
29. On the proposed bill in Wisconsin (SENATE BILL 353) see United States
Daily, April 14,1931, at 366.
30 In those states having old and incomplete statutes legislative reform
can do much to aid the commissions in exercising indirect control. A dis-
cussion of such desirable statutory provisions is not in order here but it is
suggested, for example, that all statutes could well allow the commission
to institute investigations, place the burden of proof on the utility wherever
possible, and give the commission power to supervise the sale of utility
securities whether the purchaser be a utility or not. For a review of the
law suggesting the possibility of direct statutory control see REPORT OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS SPEcIAm CommIssIoN ON CONTROL AND CONDUCT OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES (1929) pp. 237-249. Also see the discussion of legislation in
Lilienthal, supra, note 31, CoL. L. REV. 189.
" See REPORT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS SPECIAL COD151ISSION ON CONTROL
AND CONDUCT OF PUBLIC UTILITIES (1929) p. 221.
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the avenues opened by Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co." but
such concessions, made by the courts when commission protests
reach a certain potential, do not promise a satisfactory solution.A
More efficacious would be a thorough remodelling by the courts
of the concept of "utility" to include the holding company, and
of the concept of "foreign" to give some measure of jurisdiction
over the foreign parent of a domestic subsidiary. Whether or
not a greater degree of control over holding companies is desir-
able, however, a realistic apprehension of the subject demands
a recognition of the extent to which the commissions have
expanded the sphere of regulation delimited for them by court
rules.
TAXATION OF ITINERANT SALESMEN
THE house-to-house canvasser, or itinerant salesman, occupies an
anomalous legal position. When carrying goods with him for
immediate delivery after sale he is termed a "peddler," is said
to be engaged in intrastate commerce, and becomes subject to
municipal or state taxation.1 When, however, he sells, either
32282 U. S. 133, 51 Sup. Ct. 15 (1930).
33 The constant protests of the commissions may well have been instru-
mental in causing the recent redefinition of the rule of "close scrutiny"
in the Smith case, supra note 32, wherein it was held that bad faith was
no longer the only cause for setting aside management contracts, but that
the actual cost to the parent of providing such services should be the test
of reasonableness. (See Comments on this case, supra note 2). This
process is a prolonged and costly one, however, as is illustrated by the
case of Re Michigan Bell Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1923 A 31 (Mich. Pub.
Util. Comm. 1922) (Commission cut down the 41A% contract for rate pur-
poses); P. U. R. 1922 E 584 (Mich. Pub. Util. Comm. 1922) (second order
segregating City of Detroit). The utility then obtained a temporary injunc-
tion in a Federal court. This was dropped as needless since the commission
was refused a mandamus to compel performance of its order in 228 Mich.
658, 200 N. W. 749 (1924). Final disposition, P. U. R. 1926 C 607 (Mich.
Pub. Util. Comm. 1926). See also theunusually prolonged history of the
Smith case, supra note 32, set out in 40 YALE L. J. at 810 n. 4.
1 State v. Schofield, 136 La. 702, 67 So. 557 (1915); State v. Webber,
214 Mo. 272, 113 S. W. 1054 (1908). Moreover, the peddlers may be classi-
fied according to the kind of goods sold. Sernovitz v. State, 133 Wis. 231,
113 N. W. 277 (1907) ; Attorney General v. Byles, 93 Ark. 612, 126 S. W. 94
(1910). Or according to the manner of sale. Smith v. Wilkins, 164 N. C.
135, 80 S. E. 168 (1913). However, the classification must have some reason-
able basis. Park City v. Daniels, 46 Utah 554, 149 Pac. 1094 (1915). The
distinction between goods produced by the peddler or by another is rea-
sonable. State v. Montgomery, 92 Me. 433, 43 Atl. 13 (1899). But
an exemption given only to "commercial" agents has been held invalid.
Smith v. Farr, 46 Colo. 364, 104 Pac. 401 (1909). Subject to the
above qualification the license fee may be graduated. Flournoy v. Walker,
126 La. 489, 52 So. 673 (1910).
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with or without sample, for subsequent interstate delivery of the
purchased goods he is called a "drummer," is considered an
instrument of interstate commerce, and is therefore immune
from municipal or state regulations, whether they impose a
license tax or establish bonding requirements conditioned upon
the future delivery of the purchased goods.2
This distinction was first judicially recognized in the case of
Robbins v. Shelby County Taaing District,3 decided in 1886.
Tennessee had passed a statute requiring a license fee of $10
per week or $25 per month from all salesmen not having a regu-
larly licensed place of business in the taxing district of Shelby.
In no event was a license to be issued for a period longer than
three months and violation of the statute was made a misde-
meanor involving a fine or imprisonment. A salesman for an
Ohio corporation was convicted in the state court for operation
without the required license. But on appeal to the United States
Supreme Court the statute was held violative of Article 1, Sec-
tion 8, of the Constitution as a burden upon interstate commerce.
The court went beyond the requirements of the case in the lan-
guage employed, indicating that the statute would in any event
be invalidated as a discrimination against interstate commerce.
The three dissenting judges 5 in the Robbins case said, through
Mr. Justice Waite:
"I cannot believe that if Robbins had opened an office for his
business within the taxing district in which he kept and exhibited
samples it would be held that he would not be liable to the tax
and this whether he stayed there all the time or came only at
intervals." a
The statement is suggestive of a confusion between an occupation
tax on the business of the office with a property tax which is
admittedly valid.7 Also implicit in the dissent is the theory that
2 Powell, Contemporary Commerce Clause Controrcrsies over State Taxa-
tion, (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 773; Brown, Restrictions on State Taxa-
tion Because of Interference with Federal Functions (1931) 17 VA. L. REv.
325; Landis, The Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Taxatiou
(1922). 20 AICH. L. REv. 50. Cf. Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Rich-
mond, 298 Fed. 126 (D. C. N. D. Cal 1924) (city ordinance prohibiting a
peddler or solicitor from knocking on doors of dwelling houses bearing a
sign "no peddlers allowed" held invalid as applied to a non-resident
drummer who violated the ordinance while filling orders for a foreign manu-
facturing company), criticized in Note (1924) 11 VA L. Rsv. 141.
3 120 U. S. 489, 7 Sup. Ct. 592 (1886).
4Supra note 3, at 489, 7 Sup. Ct. at 592.
5 Justices Waite, Field and Gray.
6 Supra note 3, at 500, 7 Sup. Ct. at 598.
7 The tangible personal property and any real property within the state
would, of course, be subject to property taxation. C. W. Wickersham,
Double Taxation (1926) 12 VA. L. REv. 185.
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the presence of an office within the state constitutes "doing busi-
ness" for all purposes. Yet subsequent cases are in sharp conflict
as to the effect of an office within the state even for the purpose
of requiring the corporation to qualify." And in any event the
implications of this conflict have had no bearing on the validity
of a state license tax on drummers who operate from an office
within the state for sale and subsequent interstate delivery of
goods.9 The immunity of such a sales office, repeatedly tested
before the courts, has been recently reaffirmed in Myers v. City
of Miami 10 where a municipal occupation tax was imposed upon
the local sales office of the Real Silk Hosiery Mills, a foreign
corporation. The office included a staff of salesmen who solicited
orders to be filled by delivery direct to the purchaser C. 0. D.
The Supreme Court of Florida, conceding that the tax was not
discriminatory or excessive, nevertheless held it to be invalid as
a burden upon interstate commerce. In its decision the court
was supported by an undeviating line of precedents."
In harmony with the decision in the Robbins case further prin-
ciples governing the taxability of drummers have been pro-
nounced by the courts and now appear settled. The method of
his compensation is immaterial, and whether he be paid by
salary 12 or by allowing him to retain a pal of the purchase
price 13 he is not subject to a tax. While ordinarily the salary
will be in form of a check from the home office it seems that a
check issued from the state office would be of the same legal
effect. Certainly this method would be no more intrastate than
the retention of a down payment made at the time of purchase.
The justification for extending the immunity even where the
8 HARING, CORPORATIONS DOING BUSINESS IN OTHER STATES (1926) 16,
17.
0 Cheney Bros. Co. v. Commonwealth of Mass., 246 U. S. 147, 38 Sup. Ct.
295 (1918); cf. Ozark Pipe Line Co. v. Monier, 266 U. S. 555, 45 Sup.
Ct. 184 (1925); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Commonwealth of Mass.,
268 U. S. 203, 45 Sup. Ct. 477 (1925).
10 131 So. 375 (Fla. 1930).
= Cason v. Quinby, 60 Fla. 35, 53 So. 741 (1910) ; Ferguson v. McDonald,
66. Fla. 494, 63 So. 915 (1913); Wilk v. Bartow, 86 Fla 186, 97 So. 307
(1923).
2 Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Mass., supra note 9; Brennan v. City
of Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 14 Sup. Ct. 829 (1894), (drummer received both
a salary and commission); Cason v. Quinby, supra note 11 (drummer
received salary but no commission); of. Ozark Pipe Line Co. v. Monier
supra note 9.
13 Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. City of Portland, 268 U. S. 325, 45 Sup. Ct.
525 (1925) (even if sustaining the statute the lower courts paid no atten-
tion to the method of payment, 294 Fed. 587 (D. C. D. Ore. 1923), 297
Fed. 897 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925), while the United States Supreme Court in
invalidating the statute expressly said that the form of payment was here
immaterial); Wilk v. City of Bartow, supra note 11; cf. Di Santo v. Penn-
sylvania, 273 U. S. 34, 47 Sup. Ct. 267 (1927).
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salesman collects on a C. 0. D. shipment is in viewing him as
a mere agent for collection analogous to a postman. 14
Furthermore the court has refused to allow the "witty diver-
sities" 15 of the law of sales to affect the immunity of drummers.
Whether the title passes within the state - or without the state 2T
or whether the sale is conditional upon the goods conforming
to sample I is held to be immaterial. The conditional sale of
goods to be paid for in installments may likewise be effected
without incurring a license tax obligation." While it has been
suggested that immunity is secured only when the sales are sub-
ject to validation by the home office this is apparently true only
in so far as it insures interstate delivery.20 And when this is
present the goods may be sent direct to the customer,21 delivery
by the salesman 22 or held at the state office at the customer's
disposal.23
In connection with the delivery of the goods it is clear that
the "original package" doctrine is inapplicable. Although Mr.
Justice Holmes once felt constrained to avoid the application of
this doctrine to drummers by restricting it to sales made after
the goods had been introduced into the state,2 4 it appears settled
that the original package doctrine applies only to foreign, and
does not apply to interstate commerce.2 5  Consequently several
orders may be commingled in one package and the salesmen
within the state charged with the separation, addressing and
4 1It is clear that the mails could be used for solicitation without sub-
jecting the corporation to a state tax. See Robbins v. Shelby County Tax-
ing District, supra note 3, at 500, 7 Sup. Ct. at 596.
S15 Holmes, J. in Rearick v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 203 U. S.
507, 27 Sup Ct. 159 (1906).
'cUpon a C. 0. D. shipment. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Sims, 191
U. S., 441, 450, 24 Sup Ct 151, 154 (1923) ("The fact that the price was to
be collected in North Carolina is too slender a thread upon which to hang
an exception of the transaction from the rule which would otherwise declare
the tax to be an interference with interstate commerce.")
17 Upon an F. 0. B. shipment. Watkins Medical Co. v. Coombes, 60 Okla.
126, 166 Pac. 1072 (1917).
18 Wilk v. City of Bartow, supra note 11.
19 Landis, op. cit. supra note 2, at 73, n. 127.
20 See Haring, op. cit. supra note 8, at 17, 32. But cf. Alpha Portland
Co. v. Mass., mtpra note 9; Brennan v. City of Titusville, snpra note 12;
Real Silk Hosiery Mills, v. Portland, supra note 13.21Alpha Portland Co. v. Mass., supra note 9; Myers v. City of Miami,
supra note 10.
.2 Wilk v. City of Bartow, supra note 11; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, supra
note 16.
23 Brennan v. City of Titusville, supra note 12 (pictures and picture
frames chosen by customer and framed by salesman for delivery).24 Rearick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 15.
25 American Steel & Wire Co., v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 24 Sup. Ct. 305
(1904) ; Landis, op. cit. supra note 2, at 65; Haring, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 17.
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delivery of the individual packages. 20 Acts of demonstration or
installation after sale, however, may be construed as intrastate
business justifying a license tax on the drummer,2 although the
rule in general is that installations by the agent which the pur-
chaser could not easily make are permissible without altering
the interstate character of the transactions."
It is only where a warehouse is located within the state, or
"spot stock" is kept for delivery to the purchaser that a license
tax is applicable to the drummer.2 And it does not alter this
circumstance that the orders may have first been sent to the
home office without the state and subsequently filled by the ware-
house upon directions from the home office.30 Thus it appears
that the decisive factor is the actual interstate transmission of
the goods after their sale within the state.3 1
The burden which state or municipal license taxes on drum-
mers are supposed to impose on interstate commerce may be
reflected either in increased prices of the articles shipped or in
the prohibitive effect on the employment of drummers. If sales-
men (drummers) were no longer used it would probably mean
that regulation of them had affected the price of the articles until
the margin of profit had to be enlarged by their removal. It is
difficult to see, however, that the price of the articles will be
greatly affected unless the license fee is excessive in which case
relief would be available. If the fee is restricted to that sum nec-
essary to defray administration expenses in connection with the
license it would affect the price of interstate articles in no
greater measure than the property tax levied against local offices
and equipment or the corporate and other taxes upon the Home
office.i '
Although the Courts have drawn a sharp distinction between
peddlers and drummers and afforded tax immunity only
to the latter, it is significant that within recent years over 800
municipal ordinances have been directed against "drummers"
alone.32 Considerable stimulus to this type of legislation has
20 Brennan v. City of Titusville, supra note 12; Wilk v. City of Bartow,
supra note 11; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 15.2TYork Mfg. Co. v. Collery, 247 U. S. 21, 38 Sup. Ct. 430 (1918);
Kansas City Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas, 269 U. S. 148, 46 Sup. Ct.
59 (1925); See Note (1926). 39 HARV. L. REV. 489.
28 Isaacs, Activity Subsequent to Interstate Commerce (1926) 25 MICH.
L. REv. 740; Note (1926) 14 CALIF. L. Ruv. 334.
29 Cf. 2 WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1929) 1065; Landis, op. cit. 'supra note 2, at 64, n. 86; Powell, Indirect
Encroachment on Federal Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States,
(1918) 31 HARv. L. REV. 573.
30 Landis, sqc. cit. supra, note 2, at 73.
31 WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra, note 29; Powell, op. cit. 8upra note 29.
32 Hemphill, The House to House Canvasser in Interstate Commerce
(1926) 60 Am. L. REV. 641.
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undoubtedly been provided by local trade programs designed
either to promote the growth of state and municipal business
or to create local shopping centers.2 In many cases outside
competition has proved injurious to local merchants unable to
cope with the competitive prices of larger concerns.34 Moreover
a nuisance element is present in the increasing number of drum-
mers who solicit from house-to-house.25 Perhaps the most instru-
mental factor, however, has been the dishonesty of many drum-
mers and solicitors, coupled with the opportunities for fraud
afforded by itinerant salesmanship: "1 it is also significant in this
connection that many companies have thought it necessary to
bond their own drummers.'7
In the light of these considerations regulation of itinerant
salesmen seems undoubtedly desirable; the same considerations
should not be without weight in determining the validity of
license taxes employed as a means of regulation. It has been
suggested that drummers and peddlers are near enough alike to
be similarly subject to state or municipal requirements8 and
also that in both situations the actual transaction is one of purely
local concern. 9  But the issue clearly defined is between the
desirability of state and municipal or federal regulation. The
power over interstate commerce would permit federal control.40
Its virtue would consist in uniform regulations, "not discordant
and retaliatory." 4  Conceivably the expense might be less than,
although practically comparable to, that incurred in state regula-
tion. On the other hand federal control would probably be
exercised in regulations placed upon and enforced against the
home office and it may be questioned whether they would be as
efficacious as state protection more easily available to the pur-
33 Hemphill, op. cit. supra note 32, at 642.
34 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, supra note 3 at 499, 7 Sup.
Ct. at 597.
3 "Town Councils will be able to protect us from the pests who are
pulling our doorbells out by the roots." Hemphill, op. cit. supra note 32,
at 648.
3GHemphill, op. cit. supra note 32, at 643, calls itinerant salesmanship
a "hatchery of fraud." He gives examples of the imposition and dishon-
esty of the "irresponsible itinerant foreigners" who conduct a "pestiferous
business in a pestiferous way."
-37Providing them with cards indicating amount and duration of the
bond, which card they are expected to display to prospective customers.
38 See dissent in Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, -?tpra note 3,
at 500, 7 Sup. Ct. at 598.
39 See dissent in Ozark Pipe Line Co. v. Monier, supra note 9, at 568,
45 Sup. Ct. at 187; cf. dissent in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, supra note 13,
at 38, 47 Sup. Ct. at 269.
40 Constitution of United States, Art. 1, §§ 8.
41 See Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, supra note 3, at 489, 7
Sup. Ct. at 597.
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chaser.12 State license fees control might be predicted on the
protection afforded, 43 or viewed as state and municipal inspection
laws to safeguard purchasers.44 When a salesman is kept within
the state more or less permanently the "continuous agency"
doctrine might justify license fees. 45 Moreover in the event of
state regulation federal supervision would not be precluded.
Excessive license fees could be restrained as a direct burden
on interstate commerce, discriminatory or excessive fees would
continue to be indirect burdens. While state control seems pref-
erable the problem should be solved in terms of effective regula-
tion rather than postponed by variant definitions of "interstate
commerce."
42 The opportunity to sue upon a bond filed within the purchaser's own
county, city or state would supply adequate protection where restrictions
on the distant home office would be theoretical in many cases.
43 See Powell, Contemporary Commerce CIause Controversie Ovcr Stato
Taxation (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 773, 959.
44 Cf. D. F. Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U. S. 494, 34 Sup. Ct 377 (1914);
Voight v. Wright, 141 U. S. 62, 11 Sup. Ct. 855 (1891); Pure Oil Co. v.
Minnesota, 248 U. S. 158, 39 Sup. Ct. 35 (1918).
4 5 Cf. International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 30 Sup, Ct. 481
(1910); International Text Book Co. v. Tone, 220 N. Y. 313, 115 N. E. 914
(1916).
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